M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996): A Parent's Termination Appeal Cannot Depend on Ability to Pay

The short answer

In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a State may not shut a parent out of an appeal from a termination decree because the parent cannot pay for the record. The Court held that Mississippi "may not deny M. L. B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

The record is what the appeals court reviews: the transcript of the trial and the other court papers M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

What the case was about

M.L.B. and S.L.J. were the mother and father of two children. After they divorced, the children stayed with their father, as the parents had agreed M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The father and his new wife then sued in a Mississippi Chancery Court to end M.L.B.'s parental rights so the stepmother could adopt the children. Their complaint said M.L.B. had not kept up reasonable visitation and was behind on child support M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

The trial judge, called the Chancellor, ended her parental rights and approved the adoption. He stated, "without elaboration," that the burden of proof had been met by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court noted that nothing in his order described the evidence M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

M.L.B. filed a timely appeal and paid the $100 filing fee. But Mississippi required her to pay $2,352.36 in advance to prepare the record. She could not pay, so she asked to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning as a person too poor to pay the costs. The Supreme Court of Mississippi said no, because in civil cases that right "exists only at the trial level." Her appeal was dismissed M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

This was not a CPS case. Private parties started it. The Court said that still made no real difference: "the challenged state action remains essentially the same," because only the State can issue a decree ending a parent-child relationship M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

What the court decided

Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy agreed with the result but wrote separately. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Thomas also dissented, joined by Justice Scalia, and by the Chief Justice except for Part II M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

The question. The Court asked whether a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, may make appeals from termination decrees depend on a parent's ability to pay record fees M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

Two strands of law. The Court said its cases on access to the courts "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns." The equal protection concern is about "fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs." The due process concern is about the basic fairness of the proceedings. The Court said most decisions in this area rest on equal protection, "as M. L. B.'s plea heavily does." One reason is that due process "does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

Weighing the interests. The Court weighed M.L.B.'s interest against the State's reason for the fee. Her stakes were "large," and termination is "irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]" of the most basic family relationship. Her termination order "describes no evidence," so only a transcript could show other judges whether the evidence was enough. The State's interest was "financial," and termination appeals "are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

The result. The Court relied on an earlier case, Mayer v. Chicago, about transcripts for a poor person appealing a minor criminal conviction. It said it would be "anomalous" to require a transcript for a misdemeanor appeal but not for M.L.B. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). It placed decrees forever ending parental rights among the cases in which the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice." It reversed and sent the case back M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

Limits. The Court kept the general rule that court fees are usually reviewed only for a rational basis. It noted that Lassiter and Santosky "have not served as precedent in other areas" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

Separate opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote that "due process is quite a sufficient basis for our holding." Justice Thomas's dissent doubted that the new right to free transcripts in civil appeals could be "effectively restricted to this case" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). These are not the Court's holding.

In the court's words

Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M. L. B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children.

In plain English: without a transcript, no appeals court could check why the judge ended her rights M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

She is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication.

In plain English: the Court compared a parent fighting termination to "a defendant resisting criminal conviction," not to an ordinary civil litigant M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

When deprivation of parental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due.

In plain English: the Court connected this case to Lassiter, which allows appointed counsel in some termination cases M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).

Why it matters for Texas families

M.L.B. is a ruling about the Fourteenth Amendment and what "a State" may do, so it reaches termination appeals in Texas too M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). It also sums up two earlier cases. It describes Lassiter as holding that appointed counsel "was not routinely required," and Santosky as holding that a "clear and convincing" proof standard "is constitutionally required in parental termination proceedings" M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981): Is There a Right to a Free Lawyer in a Termination Case? and Santosky v. Kramer (1982): The Proof Needed to End Parental Rights.

Texas law has its own rule on indigence in suits filed by a governmental entity asking for termination or a conservator Tex. Fam. Code §107.013(a). In those suits, a parent the court has found indigent "is presumed to remain indigent for the duration of the suit and any subsequent appeal," unless the court later finds a material and substantial change in the parent's finances Tex. Fam. Code §107.013(e). See Your Right to a Lawyer in a Texas CPS Case.

In a footnote, the Court listed Texas among the many States that provided for appeals by poor litigants, including transcripts, in civil cases generally. It cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(j)(1) as it stood in 1996 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). Court rules change, so ask a lawyer what applies to your appeal today. This page is legal information, not legal advice.

Related

• Santosky v. Kramer (1982): The Proof Needed to End Parental Rights
• Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981): Is There a Right to a Free Lawyer in a Termination Case?
• Your Right to a Lawyer in a Texas CPS Case