Historic cases

Landmark decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Texas that shape how CPS cases work: parents' constitutional rights, the standard of proof, the right to a lawyer, and more. Each page quotes the court's own words and links to the full opinion.

U.S. Supreme Court

Meyer v. Nebraska

262 U.S. 390 (1923)

In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a teacher's conviction under a Nebraska law that banned teaching young children in languages other than English. The Court held that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children, and that the right of parents to hire the teacher to instruct their children was part of that liberty.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

In Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Oregon law requiring children to attend public school unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. The Court said the child is not the mere creature of the State.

Prince v. Massachusetts

321 U.S. 158 (1944)

In Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a guardian's child-labor convictions for letting a nine-year-old girl distribute religious magazines on the street. The Court said the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, but that neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.

Stanley v. Illinois

405 U.S. 645 (1972)

In Stanley v. Illinois (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an unwed father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the State took his children. Denying him that hearing while giving it to other parents also violated equal protection.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

406 U.S. 205 (1972)

In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments barred Wisconsin from forcing Amish parents to send their children to formal high school until age 16. The Court stressed how narrow its ruling was and said parental power can be limited when a child's health or safety is in danger.

Parham v. J. R.

442 U.S. 584 (1979)

In Parham v. J. R. (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Georgia's procedures for admitting children to state mental hospitals at the request of a parent or the State. Due process required an inquiry by a neutral factfinder, who could be a staff physician, and periodic review, but not a formal adversary hearing.

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County

452 U.S. 18 (1981)

In Lassiter (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require a court-appointed lawyer for indigent parents in every termination case; the trial court decides case by case, subject to appellate review. Texas law sets its own rule: in a governmental suit for termination or conservatorship, the court must appoint a lawyer for an indigent parent who responds in opposition.

Santosky v. Kramer

455 U.S. 745 (1982)

In Santosky v. Kramer (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that before a State may permanently end a parent's rights, due process requires the State to support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. New York's lower preponderance standard violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services

489 U.S. 189 (1989)

In DeShaney (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a county's failure to protect a boy from his father's violence did not violate the Due Process Clause, because the Clause generally does not require a State to protect people from private violence. The Court said States may create such duties through their own laws, and it expressed no view on whether a duty arises for a child the State places in a foster home.

M.L.B. v. S.L.J.

519 U.S. 102 (1996)

In M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Mississippi could not deny a mother, because of her poverty, an appeal from the decree terminating her parental rights by requiring her to prepay record preparation fees. The State had to give her a record complete enough for the appeals court to consider her claims.

Troxel v. Granville

530 U.S. 57 (2000)

In Troxel v. Granville (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a ruling for a mother who objected to a court order giving her children's grandparents more visitation than she wanted. There was no majority opinion; the four-Justice plurality said Washington's visitation law was unconstitutional as applied because the judge gave no special weight to a fit parent's decision.

Haaland v. Brackeen

599 U.S. 255 (2023)

In Haaland v. Brackeen (2023), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected every challenge that Texas and several families brought against the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), some on the merits and others for lack of standing. It did not decide whether ICWA's placement preferences violate equal protection, because no party before it had standing to raise that claim.

Supreme Court of Texas

Holley v. Adams

544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976)

In Holley v. Adams (1976), the Supreme Court of Texas reversed a judgment ending a mother's parental rights because there was no evidence that termination was in her son's best interest. The opinion listed factors courts consider when deciding a child's best interest, now often called the Holley factors.

In the Interest of C.H., a Minor Child

89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002)

In In re C.H. (2002), the Supreme Court of Texas held that when a parent challenges the factual sufficiency of termination findings, the appeals court asks whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations. It also said the Holley best-interest factors are not a checklist that must all be proved.

In the Interest of J.F.C., A.B.C., and M.B.C., Minor Children

96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002)

In In re J.F.C. (2002), the Supreme Court of Texas held that because termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence, an appeals court reviewing legal sufficiency must ask whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. On the facts, the Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment ending both parents' rights.

In the Interest of B.L.D. and B.R.D., Minor Children

113 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. 2003)

In In re B.L.D. (2003), the Supreme Court of Texas held that when one appointed lawyer represents both parents in a termination case, the trial court asks whether there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's duties to one parent would materially and adversely affect the other. It also held that, as a general rule, due process does not require appeals courts to review jury-charge complaints the parents never raised at trial.

In re Ricky Derzapf

219 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2007)

In In re Derzapf (2007), the Supreme Court of Texas ordered a trial court to undo temporary orders giving grandparents visits over a fit father's objection. A step-grandfather had no standing under the grandparent-access statute, and the grandmother had not proved that denying access would significantly impair the children's physical health or emotional well-being.

In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008)

In this 2008 case about the removal of 468 children from the YFZ Ranch, the Supreme Court of Texas left in place a court of appeals ruling that the removal was not warranted on the record for the children involved. The Court said the Family Code gives trial courts broad authority to protect children short of separating them from their parents and placing them in foster care.

In the Interest of E.R., J.B., E.G., and C.L., Children

385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012)

In In re E.R. (2012), the Supreme Court of Texas held that serving a mother by newspaper publication violated due process when the Department knew who she was, was in regular contact with her, and met with her after suing. The Family Code's six-month limit on attacking a termination order cannot bar a challenge by a parent denied constitutionally adequate notice, but a parent who learns of the judgment must act diligently.

In the Interest of E.N.C., J.A.C., S.A.L., N.A.G. and C.G.L., Minor Children

384 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2012)

In In re E.N.C. (2012), the Supreme Court of Texas held the evidence was legally insufficient to end a deported father's rights. Deportation following an old offense, with no evidence about that offense, could not prove an endangering course of conduct, and the record did not support a best-interest finding.

In the Interest of N.G., a Child

577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019)

In In re N.G. (2019), the Supreme Court of Texas held that when a parent appeals termination findings under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E), due process requires the appeals court to review them, even if another ground is enough to affirm, because those findings can be used to end the parent's rights to other children.

In re C.J.C.

603 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. 2020)

In In re C.J.C. (2020), the Supreme Court of Texas held that when a nonparent asks a court for conservatorship or access over a fit parent's objection, the court must presume the fit parent decides the child's best interest. This applies even in a suit to modify an existing custody order that names the parent a managing conservator.

In the Interest of D.T., a Child

625 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. 2021)

In In re D.T. (2021), the Supreme Court of Texas held that a parent who opposes a government-initiated termination suit may claim on appeal that her lawyer was ineffective, whether the lawyer was appointed or hired. The mother's claim failed under the Strickland test, so the Court affirmed the termination.

Case summaries explain what each court decided, using quotes checked word for word against the saved opinion text. Later cases or laws may limit or change how a decision applies. This is legal information, not legal advice.