Santosky v. Kramer (1982): The Proof Needed to End Parental Rights

The short answer

In Santosky v. Kramer, the U.S. Supreme Court decided how sure a court must be before a State can permanently end a parent's rights to a child. That is called termination of parental rights. The Court held that "due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). New York's lower standard, a "fair preponderance of the evidence," violated the Fourteenth Amendment Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

A standard of proof is the rule that tells the judge how convinced they must be before finding that something is true.

What the case was about

Under New York law, the State could end parents' rights over their objection if it found that a child was "permanently neglected." Only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" had to support that finding Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Court pointed out that this was no more certainty than is "necessary to award money damages in an ordinary civil action" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The parents in the case were John Santosky II and Annie Santosky. The Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services started a neglect case. In October 1978, he asked the Family Court to terminate the parents' rights to their three children Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The parents argued that the preponderance standard was unconstitutional. The Family Court judge rejected that argument. He found that the parents could not plan for their children's future, even with public assistance Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The judge then held a dispositional hearing, a later hearing to decide what placement would serve the children's best interests, and ordered "permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The parents appealed. New York's Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed their appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear their constitutional claim Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

What the court decided

Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and Justice O'Connor Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Only the majority opinion states what the Court held.

The Court started from the parents' side. It said a parent's fundamental liberty interest in a child does not disappear just because the parent was not a model parent or lost temporary custody to the State. When the State moves to "destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

To decide what is fair, the Court weighed three things: the private interests affected, the risk of error from the State's procedure, and the government's interest Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). It found that in termination cases, the parents' interest is "commanding," the risk of error under a preponderance standard is "substantial," and the government's interest in that standard is "comparatively slight" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The Court gave reasons for the risk of error. The State's ability to build its case almost always dwarfs the parents' ability to defend. For the parents, a wrong termination means "the unnecessary destruction of their natural family," so a standard that splits the risk of error almost evenly does not fit Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Court also said a stricter standard would reduce errors without large costs to the State Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The Court did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It noted that a legislature might conclude that standard would be an unreasonable barrier to freeing children for adoption. Instead, it held that clear and convincing evidence gives the level of certainty due process requires. Whether to require that standard or a higher one "is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The Court sent the case back to New York. It expressed "no view on the merits" of the parents' claims. At a new hearing under a proper standard, the Court said, the parents "may or may not prevail" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

In the court's words

The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.

In plain English: a parent whose child is in foster care still has a constitutional interest in that child Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.

In plain English: until unfitness is proven, a wrong termination hurts the child as well as the parents Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability to mount a defense.

In plain English: the State is usually the stronger side in a termination trial, one reason the Court raised the bar Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.

In plain English: ending parental rights is one of the most serious things a government can do Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

Why it matters for Texas families

Santosky is a ruling about the U.S. Constitution, and it speaks to what due process requires before "a State" may sever parental rights. So it sets a minimum that applies in Texas too. The Court left each State free to require that standard or a higher one Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In a footnote, the Court listed Texas among the States whose courts already required clear and convincing evidence or its equivalent, citing In re G. M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

The holding is about termination: the point when a State seeks to "sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Other CPS court steps have their own rules. For example, in a Texas court-ordered services case, the judge must deny DFPS's petition unless the evidence would "satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution" of certain findings Tex. Fam. Code §264.203(m). See Court-Ordered Services in Texas CPS Cases (Family Code §264.203). The Court also noted that a federal law, the Indian Child Welfare Act, requires "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" to terminate Indian parental rights Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). See Haaland v. Brackeen (2023): The Court Rejects Challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act.

Santosky also looked back at Lassiter, decided the Term before. Lassiter held that due process does not require appointed counsel for indigent parents in every termination case Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Texas law goes further by statute. In a suit filed by a governmental entity asking for termination or a conservator, the court must appoint an attorney ad litem (a court-appointed lawyer) for an indigent parent who responds in opposition Tex. Fam. Code §107.013(a). See Your Right to a Lawyer in a Texas CPS Case.

If you face a termination case, ask your lawyer what standard of proof applies at each hearing. This is legal information, not legal advice.

Related

• Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981): Is There a Right to a Free Lawyer in a Termination Case?
• Stanley v. Illinois (1972): An Unwed Father's Right to a Fitness Hearing
• M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996): A Parent's Termination Appeal Cannot Depend on Ability to Pay
• Your Right to a Lawyer in a Texas CPS Case
• Court-Ordered Services in Texas CPS Cases (Family Code §264.203)
• The Texas CPS Investigation Process, Step by Step (Family Code §§261.301–261.302)